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This paper analyzes how economic deregulation impacts firm strategies and environmental
quality in the electric utility industry. We find evidence that the deregulation introduced to
this historically staid industry has stimulated environmental differentiation. Differentiation is
most likely to appear where its point of uniqueness is valued by customers, and we confirm this
relationship in our sample. Specifically, utilities that served customers who exhibited higher levels
of environmental sensitivity generated more ‘green’ power. The tendency for firms to differentiate
in this way is lessened if they are relatively more dependent on coal-fired generation or relatively
more efficient. Thus, there is evidence that firms sort themselves into either differentiation or low-
cost strategies as the competitive realities of a deregulated world unfold. Deregulation and the
ensuing environmental differentiation illustrate how utilities exploited formerly unmet customer
demand for green power. The result has been greater levels of renewable generation and, hence,
a cleaner environment. Copyright  2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Institutional change can advance the welfare of
society. For example, properly designed public
policies can augment the supply of public goods,
like a healthy natural environment. Institutional
change also has the potential to reshape the com-
petitive landscape and lead to new strategic choices
by firms. This was illustrated when firms created
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a variety of strategies in reaction to regulatory
reforms that promoted market instruments for
reducing pollution. But how are institutional
change, strategic choice, and the supply of public
goods related? Studies that link all three of these
factors are difficult to find.
We attempt to fill this important gap with a study
of deregulation, differentiation, and the provision
of ‘green’ power in the electric utility. We believe
that under deregulation the familiar pattern of firms
applying their resources to differential strategies
will take place. For utilities, this process was stim-
ulated by new freedoms that allowed them to view
ratepayers not as an aggregate mass of demand
but as an amalgam of distinct customer groups.
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Strategies they then developed reflected choices
about serving these customer groups. To appreci-
ate this and other examples of strategies driven by
deregulation, we leverage the literature on insti-
tutional change and strategic choice. This permits
us to fashion theories about how deregulation will
elicit environmental differentiation as a function of
firm and contextual variables.
We test hypotheses that follow from this theory
development. We find evidence that deregulation
triggered differentiation behavior by utilities, in
the form of increased generation of ‘green’ power.
Furthermore, this differentiation is accentuated in
states where the populace displays greater levels
of environmental sensitivity. Thus, the principles
of effective differentiation have been applied in the
industry. Together, these results expand our knowl-
edge about using institutional change as a vehi-
cle for broadening the provision of public goods.
In this way, significant public policy implications
flow from our results.
Strategic response to deregulation
A rich and diverse literature explores how eco-
nomic regulation and deregulation have impacted
the behavior of firms. Theories have been devel-
oped by drawing liberally from the literature in
strategic management and organization theory. A
common theme has been that institutional change
redraws industry boundaries, shifts the scope of
permissible activities for incumbents and entrants,
and otherwise changes incentives for behavior
(e.g., Bonardi, 2004; Delmas and Tokat, 2005;
Fuentelsaz, Gomez, and Polo, 2002; Haveman,
1993; Haveman, Russo, and Meyer, 2001; Meyer,
Brooks, and Goes, 1990; Miller and Chen, 1994;
Smith and Grimm, 1987).
A number of studies have focused on the con-
nection between institutional change and strategic
choices made by organizations following deregu-
lation. Before reviewing these, it is important to
note that deregulation can take many forms. To
name just a few, deregulation can permit new com-
petitors to enter a field previously closed to them
(e.g., airlines), it can allow incumbents to com-
pete in fields previously closed to them (e.g., sav-
ings and loans), and it can remove restrictions on
pricing (long-distance telecommunications). Fre-
quently, deregulation combines some or all of
these. The competitive implications of deregula-
tory regimes can vary greatly—one reason they
have elicited very different reactions in affected
industries.
Regulation can engender a strong family resem-
blance among the strategies pursued by affected
firms. In large measure, this is due to the incentive
structure faced by a regulated firm. Under regula-
tion, these incentives can differ acutely from those
at work in market competition. In fact, under some
forms of economic regulation it actually can be in
the interest of the firm to be, in Porter’s (1985)
phrase, ‘stuck in the middle.’ This peculiar out-
come is due to the lack of incentives to innovate
on any important dimension. Prior to deregula-
tion, this situation arguably existed in the indus-
try that we study here: electric utilities. Utilities
were granted a guaranteed rate of return on tra-
ditional activities but were subject to some risk if
they innovated, because regulators could rule costs
associated with this activity imprudent if innova-
tive efforts fail. So few utilities were willing to
be first movers and companies tend to look very
similar to one another.
Deregulation, by contrast, consistently stimu-
lates processes of strategic choice.1 Smith and
Grimm (1987) identified profound shifts in the
strategies of railroads following deregulation.
Haveman (1993) found that, once able to diver-
sify, savings and loans expanded aggressively into
new domains. Bonardi (1999) showed how cus-
tomer segmentation followed regulatory relaxation
in British telecommunications, with some firms
targeting specific customer segments and others
competing aggressively on price. Cho and Ham-
brick (2006) established that deregulation shifted
managerial perspectives to a more entrepreneurial
mindset. Russo (2001) found that new technologi-
cal forms appeared in the utility industry following
institutional change that facilitated entry.
Several studies have suggested that particular
strategies can pay off under deregulation. Smith
and Grimm (1987), studying railroads after dereg-
ulation, found that the differentiators outperformed
others. Corsi et al. (1991) replicated the result
in their study of the less-than-truckload trucking
industry following deregulation. Haveman (1992)
found that diversification by savings and loans
1 Not all industries experienced short-term changes by
incumbents. In the airline industry (Winston, 1998), incumbents
were slow to embrace change following deregulation. Looking
at the response of banks to the Community Reinvestment Act,
Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, and Hunt (1998) also found resistance
to change.
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after their deregulation generally augmented prof-
its, though the greatest gains were captured by
firms that leveraged their existing competency
base. In the context of the retail deregulation in
the U.S. electric utility sector, Delmas and Tokat
(2005) showed that firms that were vertically inte-
grated into electricity generation or that relied on
the market for the supply of their electricity were
more efficient than firms that adopted hybrid struc-
tures combining vertical integration and contract-
ing for power.
The strategic archetypes of differentiation and
cost leadership have consistently materialized in
industries undergoing deregulation. In airlines, the
rise of the hub and spoke system meant that flyers
were much more conveniently served by airlines
that had the city nearest to them as a hub, because
that airline could offer so many non-stop routes.
Airlines with a given city for a hub thus were dif-
ferentiated from airlines that would need to have
passengers change planes in their own hubs en
route to their destination. Schneider National, a
long-time competitor in the truckload segment of
long-distance trucking, responded to deregulation
by launching a low-cost strategy that leveraged
operating efficiencies created by heavy invest-
ment in logistics and communications infrastruc-
ture (Schneider National, 2005; Winston, 1998).
While the studies we have reviewed have collec-
tively traced out an interesting body of literature
in the area of institutional change and strategic
choice, management researchers have tended to
avoid the normative elements of these processes
(Russo, 2001; Shapiro and Rynes, 2005; Tucker,
1994). Only Wholey and Sanchez (1991) explored
the normative element of regulatory change in a
theoretical piece on the health care industry. Per-
haps because they often position the organization
as the unit of analysis, management scholars have
not analyzed strategic choice under deregulation
with an eye toward understanding public goods
provision and other ‘higher-order’ questions.
It is true that economists have focused on
the public welfare aspects of deregulation. For
example, Winston (1998) summarized the state
of knowledge on six deregulated industry sec-
tors, ranging from airlines to banking to natu-
ral gas. He concluded that following deregula-
tion all industries displayed strong tendencies to
increase consumer welfare via decreased costs and
better service. But because Winston focused on the
industry as the unit of analysis, individual organi-
zational responses to deregulation were not empha-
sized. Similarly, studies of public safety elements
of deregulation (Alexander, 1992; Rose, 1992)
reveal a generally positive relationship between the
two but do not address the organizational level of
analysis.
As important as these findings are, the link
between the strategies of organizations follow-
ing institutional change and how these strategies
impact societal outcomes is poorly understood.
Thus, strategists do not have answers to impor-
tant questions such as these: How do strategic
choices made by organizations following deregula-
tion influence the provision of public goods? How
does the provision of such public goods reflect the
context in which the organization operates? We
attempt to address these questions in our analy-
sis. Essentially, we argue that deregulation will
create public goods when it acts to permit strate-
gic choices that respond to emergent demand for
goods whose consumption has public goods con-
sequences.
Heterogeneity in strategic choice, when com-
bined with the rise of consumer expectations for
environmental stewardship, forms the backdrop for
our study of deregulation and strategic choice in
the electric utility industry. It is instructive to
begin with a brief historical sketch of how strate-
gic asymmetries are beginning to appear within the
electric utility industry. As we hope to show, this
industry and the change that it is now experiencing
form an excellent context in which to test theories
that we then develop.
Deregulation in the electric power industry
Until relatively recently, the $300 billion U.S.
electric power industry consisted mainly of ver-
tically integrated utilities serving various ‘service
areas’ under exclusive franchise agreements. Typ-
ically, utilities were vertically integrated, produc-
ing power that they then distributed to customers.
This arrangement has metamorphosed under dereg-
ulation plans that introduced retail competition in
California, New York, Illinois, Texas, Michigan,
Arizona, New Mexico, and several states in the
New England and Mid-Atlantic regions. Prior to
retail deregulation, electricity rates were set on a
cost recovery basis and customers had one provider
to buy from. Investments in physical assets were
granted a rate of return, while fuels costs were
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passed through to customers directly. Such an
arrangement had its pitfalls, most notably a built-in
incentive to overinvest in physical assets (Averch
and Johnson, 1962), but did result in a reliable,
well-understood mode of operation.
The roots of modern deregulation lie in the Pub-
lic Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of
1978 (Russo, 2001). By forcing utilities to pur-
chase electricity from private generators, policy-
makers began to see that vertical integration in
the industry was not essential to its operation. The
law set in motion the processes that have chal-
lenged the concept of the utility monopoly and led
to significant deregulatory initiatives. The next leg-
islative impetus for restructuring was the Energy
Policy Act of 1992. This act set the stage for
deregulation by facilitating entry into power sales
markets. Critically, it required utilities that owned
transmission lines to provide non-discriminatory
access to their grids for the purposes of selling
wholesale electricity (Brennan, Palmer, and Mar-
tinez, 2002). The act thus opened the possibility
that states could promote competition not only at
the wholesale level but also at the retail level.
The Energy Policy Act also delegated to states the
power to decide for themselves how to proceed.
State regulatory commissions thus were the plat-
form for most of the subsequent initiatives toward
electric utility deregulation.
This activity has followed the familiar diffusion
process across time, as states adopted retail dereg-
ulation at different points in time. California was
a leader, as its Public Utilities Commission issued
a staff report in 1993 and followed up by formally
ruling in favor of retail competition in late 1995.
After working its way through the regulatory and
legislative process, deregulation began in 1998.
As Table 1 shows, deregulation diffused relatively
rapidly after that. A frequent sticking point in the
negotiations concerning deregulation was the dis-
position of so-called ‘stranded costs.’ These were
costs for existing plants that were so expensive
to build that their power would be uneconomic in
a competitive marketplace. In some states, recov-
ery of stranded costs represented a quid pro quo
for utilities. Recovery might take place via spread-
ing such stranded costs across all power sold in a
state, so that the utility was not competitively dis-
advantaged. A practice common to all states was
the placing of a cap on the prices that utilities
could charge under deregulation, and in one state
Table 1. Retail deregulation by statea
State Year of deregulation
Arizona 1998
Arkansas 1999
California 1998
Connecticut 1998
Delaware 1999
District of Columbia 2000
Illinois 1998
Maine 1998
Maryland 1998
Massachusetts 1998
Michigan 1998
Montana 1998
Nevada 1998
New Hampshire 1998
New Jersey 1998
New Mexico 1999
New York 1998
Ohio 1999
Oklahoma 1998
Oregon 1999
Pennsylvania 1998
Rhode Island 1998
Texas 1999
Virginia 1998
Vermont 1998
West Virginia 2000
a Note: Utilities from other states that did not deregulate by 2000
are also in the sample.
utilities were required to divest their generating
assets.
Consistent with other industries, as deregulation
has unfolded in the electric generation industry,
so has a range of strategic responses. Some firms,
such as Montana Power Company, stress low-cost
power and focus on minimizing generation costs
and prices to consumers. Differentiation also is
possible, although it is difficult in this industry
because there are few products as quintessentially
commoditized as a kilowatt-hour. For this rea-
son, differentiation must take place in other ways,
which highlights an important point of connection
between deregulation and environmental quality.
Differentiating by offering power produced using
less environmentally harmful methods is the most
prevalent of these strategies.
An example of a utility working to differ-
entiate itself by offering green power is Port-
land General Electric. The utility works through
requests for proposals to add significantly to its
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generation of green electricity. It offers a port-
folio of different green power options to cus-
tomers, designed to connect with whatever might
be their environmental leanings. Some of these
offerings stress salmon restoration or expanded
wind energy use (Portland General Electric Com-
pany, 2004).
From the initial sales of green power by several
utilities in 1993, the movement has grown to the
point where more than 500 investor-owned utili-
ties, municipal utilities, and cooperatives—serving
roughly half of America’s population—offer green
power options for customers (U.S. Department of
Energy, 2004). Green power is actively marketed
by utilities, employing a myriad of options. In
addition to a well-known source, hydroelectric-
ity, they include power from sources as diverse
as biomass, wind, solar, geothermal, and landfill
gas (U.S. Department of Energy, 2001). Accord-
ing to Bird, Swezey, and Aabakken (2004), the
number of customers participating in utility green
pricing programs increased fourfold between 1999
and 2002 to a total of 711,500. Although still
relatively small in total number, a continuation
at anything like this 3-year rate will create size-
able aggregate demand in the next decade. Wiser
et al. (2001) projected total demand for green
power from 2000 through 2010. Actual experience
through 2002 suggests that if the current trends
continue demand for green power will quadruple
between 2002 and 2010. Though not associated
with regulation or deregulation, the supply of green
power also is being boosted by programs known
as Renewable Portfolio Standards that mandate
levels of renewable power used by utilities in a
state.
There are several options available to customers
to pay for green power, including monthly sur-
charges, kilowatt-hour premiums, and even volun-
tary contributions. In 2002 per kilowatt-hour pre-
miums ranged from 0.7 to 17.6 cents/kWh, with
a median of 2.5 cents/kWh (Bird et al., 2004).
The higher prices charged for green power are
attributable to the higher costs faced by providers
in securing sources of this power.
The theories that we now develop spotlight how
this phenomenon can be viewed as environmental
differentiation. We show how attempts of electric
companies to lessen their environmental impact
and broaden their use of more environmentally
sensitive generating technologies represent strate-
gic responses to the early stages of deregulation.
DEREGULATION AND STRATEGIC
CHOICE
Recall that we are interested in how strategic
choices made by organizations following deregu-
lation influence the provision of public goods and
how this activity reflects the context in which the
organization operates. Essentially, we will argue
that as deregulation unfolds, choices made by utili-
ties will lead to greater asymmetries among electric
providers—and that the extent of environmental
differentiation reflects desires within a given orga-
nization’s service territory for environmental qual-
ity. By eliciting differentiation via the provision
of power from renewable resources, the end result
is improvement of public goods, such as air and
water quality.
The critical element of the story is that following
deregulation utilities will differentiate in ways that
reflect their customers. Under economic regulation,
and with monopoly provision of electrical service,
there were essentially three types of customers:
industrial, commercial, and residential. (It was not
quite this simple, since there were differences
among the industrial customers in terms of time
of use pricing, interruptible service, and so on,
but a customer still only had one provider.) For
utilities with monopoly franchises, there was little
incentive to think further about how customers
differed within each of these customer classes.
Other elements of regulation acted to suppress
possibilities for green power sales. First, of course,
was the fact of monopoly status. Even if there was
latent demand for green power among customers,
responding to them by unbundling services rep-
resented an innovation that utilities would tend to
view with skepticism, given the risks of innovation
described above (Serchuk and Hirsh, 1998).2 Sec-
ond was the traditional system of utility account-
ing, which aggregated costs from all types of gen-
eration and then apportioned them to kilowatt-hour
prices. Under this regime, developed and institu-
tionalized over nearly a century of practice, cre-
ating a green power product by pulling out just
the costs associated with those plants represented
not only a substantial shift in accounting prac-
tice but, equally, a profound regulatory challenge
2 While still monopolies, a small number of utilities offered
‘green pricing programs,’ where customers simply were charged
higher prices, with the premium often not linked to any actual
source of power (Sweezy, Houston, and Porter, 1998).
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(Costello, 1995). These factors worked together to
keep potential ‘green customers’ out of the picture
prior to retail deregulation.
However, under deregulation the freedoms con-
ferred on utilities and the competitive threats that
they face can be expected to elicit differentia-
tion strategies. These strategies can lead to envi-
ronmental products succeeding in the marketplace
because of the emergence of customer classes that
were suppressed under regulation by its histori-
cal accounting practices and lack of incentives for
innovation. Free to offer green power options, util-
ities can use such initiatives to differentiate them-
selves in ways that reflect their new realities under
deregulation.
Where might such environmental differentiation
strategies emerge first? To address this question, it
is instructive to look at differentiation strategies in
conceptual terms. The concept of differentiation is
simple and well known, and was given its most rig-
orous treatment in Michael Porter’s 1985 treatise,
Competitive Advantage (Porter, 1985). Essentially,
differentiation is based on the perception of the
customer that a product is distinct from those of
competitors. There are many points of differentia-
tion, including brand image, quality, features, and
service. Differentiation usually inflates the cost of
a product or service, so that the firm employing the
differentiation strategy will succeed only if the cus-
tomer sees value in the point of differentiation such
that he or she is willing to pay a premium for the
product. The differentiator will succeed if this pre-
mium is greater than the additional costs incurred
by differentiating (e.g., image-related advertising
or additional service representatives), and sales
volume is sufficient.
As noted, in the electricity industry, one straight-
forward way to differentiate is by offering green
power. Given that there is some evidence of will-
ingness to pay for green power (Byrnes, Jones, and
Goodman, 1999) this can be a viable source of dif-
ferentiation. Evidence suggests that, in fact, green
power marketing is enjoying a significant growth
spurt in the United States (Bird and Swezey, 2003).
On the other hand, at least in the short run, green
power has tended to be more expensive than other
sources (Burtraw, Palmer, and Heintzelman, 2000),
creating the classic differentiation–cost trade-off.
Of great importance is whether or not the point
of differentiation is valued by customers, for if they
are not willing to pay the premium associated with
that differentiation the strategy will fail (Reinhardt,
1998). Almost any type of differentiation will be
valued by some customers; the key is to appeal
to enough customers to ensure its viability. This
is why we believe that the relationship between
deregulation and differentiation strategy will be
moderated by contextual variables that allow us to
capture this valuation. Specifically, we argue that
the environmental sensitivity of the population will
moderate the relationship, such that the greater that
sensitivity the more likely is deregulation to lead
to environmental differentiation.
Environmentally sensitive consumers are gen-
erally better educated and enjoy higher incomes
(Ottman, 1998). And they can be expected to have
an effect on the electric utilities performance and
behavior—but only where deregulation has been
set in motion. Where deregulation is underway
and competition can be expected, we believe that
environmental differentiation will take place. Cus-
tomers that value green power will see the chance
to purchase it and be more likely to do so.
Thus, institutional change can shift the com-
petitive landscape and offer new opportunities to
competitors. A company can make the strategic
shifts necessary to meet this interest by shifting
its investments to reflect the new strategic imper-
ative. If the firm follows this agenda, it will have
to create or purchase the specific assets necessary
to respond to the demands of customers. Only by
strategically altering its generation mix will it be
able to create value by successfully differentiating.
In this sample, where a firm’s market reflects
environmental sensitivity, we would expect com-
panies to make greater investments to augment
their renewable generation. In summary, we hy-
pothesize that environmental differentiation in the
electric utility sector will appear under two con-
ditions. First, retail deregulation needs to be in
place to allow for differentiation strategies to
emerge. Second, demand for environmental quality
should be present in the state. We argue that when
these two conditions are present firms will have
the incentive to pursue environmental differenti-
ation strategies. They will do this by increasing
their investments in renewable energy-generating
resources. Hence:
Hypothesis 1: Under conditions of deregulation,
the greater the level of environmental sensitivity
among a generation company’s customers, the
higher the increase in renewable generation.
6
Strategic change must reflect the demands of
the marketplace, but it also must respect the real-
ities of the organization undergoing change. An
organization’s existing competency base can be
the result of an initial resource endowment, tech-
nological trajectories, luck, and any number of
other historical factors (Barney, 1991). When insti-
tutional change unveils a new opportunity in a
marketplace, firms will assess that opportunity in
a heterogeneous fashion. For some, few changes
to their resource makeup will be required to pur-
sue it. By leveraging their existing strengths they
can exploit the opportunity. For others, developing
these resources will threaten long-embedded com-
petencies and competitive advantages, and be less
likely to be undertaken.
In the research setting here, investments in
renewable energy technologies represent a signif-
icant shift from coal-generating technologies for
two reasons. Taken together, these will suggest a
negative relationship between investments in coal
generation and investments in renewables. The first
reason has to do with strategy and the develop-
ment of path-dependent competencies. Coal-fired
generation is the beneficiary of generations-long
path dependencies that have steadily refined plant
designs and operations. Unlike oil-fired plants
that have become uneconomic to operate, nuclear
power plants which have ceased to be built, or
gas-powered plants that serve only peak loads,
coal has enjoyed steady popularity as a generat-
ing workhorse. For a utility that depends heavily
on coal, an expansion to include new technolo-
gies such as renewable generation represents a step
away from its competency base in large, central-
ized coal-fired plants.
The second reason for a negative coal–renewa-
bles relationship is the issue of reputation, since
the greater the level of coal generation, the more
difficult will it be for a utility to capture some of
the reputational benefits of creating a green elec-
tricity presence. Coal-fired electricity generation is
known to create a number of health and environ-
mental problems, including respiratory problems
and acid rain (Sawin, 2003). To the extent that
a firm is heavily invested in coal, it may well
suffer from a poor environmental reputation. With-
out some degree of legitimacy in the eyes of
customers, green offerings may be viewed with
some suspicion and therefore draw few new cus-
tomers. One prominent industry working group
identified green power as one way to reduce mer-
cury emissions from coal plants—but only if this
initiative was accompanied by information on mer-
cury emissions that would educate customers about
how their utility’s emissions compared to regional
averages (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
1999). This indicates the difficulty of overcoming
the reputational effects of burning coal. Southern
Company, one of the nation’s most prolific burners
of coal, was challenged by the U.S. Public Interest
Research group when it tried to polish its green
credentials (Odell, 2001). Thus:
Hypothesis 2: Under conditions of deregula-
tion, the lower the level of coal generation, the
greater the increase in renewable generation.
The third hypothesis states that the lower the
level of productive efficiency of the firm, the
greater its investments in renewable technologies.
Productive efficiency refers to how, in relation to
its peers, a firm can obtain maximum output with
given inputs (Farrell, 1957). To the extent that a
firm is more efficient, deregulation plays into its
strengths and the impetus for differentiation via
offering green power is lessened. Put differently,
firms that have generating resources that are well
matched to the current conditions should be the
least likely to initiate or capitalize on new initia-
tives that require changes to those resources. It is
not that there aren’t possibilities for efficient firms.
Rather, as with utilities heavily invested in coal-
fired plants, launching initiatives in green power
can divert efficient utilities from their strategic
intent (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989) and compro-
mise the clarity of their strategy.
By contrast, consider a firm saddled with a rela-
tively inefficient set of generating plants. Here, in
the price-competitive world of deregulation, dif-
ferentiation offers the potential for creating higher
margins needed to offset the higher costs due to
its inefficiency. And it is important for firms in
a deregulated environment to address such inef-
ficiencies, as without monopoly status there can
be profound marketplace penalties for inefficiency.
Utilities with inefficient plants will see their mar-
gins shrink, as they exit the cost-plus regulatory
world and enter a world of market-determined
power rates that will reflect the entry of low-cost
providers. In the inevitable push by such ineffi-
cient utilities to find new sources of margins, we
expect that they will be more interested in green
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power. As noted above, green power is differen-
tiated and sold to customers who demand it, so
it does command a premium in the marketplace.
There is evidence of a willingness to pay for green
power (Byrnes et al., 1999) and of customer loy-
alty once in a program (Farhar, 1999). With such
prospects for higher margins, there is greater incen-
tive for inefficient utilities to position themselves
to sell green power. Hence:
Hypothesis 3: Under conditions of deregulation,
the lower the level of firm productive efficiency,
the greater the increase in renewable genera-
tion.
It should be borne in mind that nothing prevents
a utility’s customers from expecting both effi-
ciency and a cleaner environment. And certainly,
even the greenest customers expect efficiency at
some level. But to the extent that there remain
trade-offs between the two, the strategy chosen by
the utility (a more efficient utility system that pro-
vides private benefits or a more expensive greener
utility system with more public benefits) will tend
to reflect the underlying population’s desires.
METHODOLOGY
To create our sample, we began with all 177
investor-owned electric utilities, together repre-
senting 84 percent of the total U.S. electricity pro-
duction by privately and publicly owned utilities
from 1998 to 2000. These utilities are incumbent
firms that were present before and after deregula-
tion. Non-utility generators were excluded due to
lack of data. Because we employed a lagged vari-
able approach for these tests to account for prior
causality and a change between two consecutive
years as a dependent variable, we lost one year
from the analysis. There were missing data for
one or more variables, leaving 114 utilities with
complete data records for the two years. Our final
sample thus contained 228 observations. Utilities
in the sample represent 61% of U.S. electricity pro-
duction.
We utilized a combination of several databases,
mainly the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Form Number 1 (FERC Form 1; U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy, 1998–2000) and the Emissions
and Generation Resource Integrated Database
(EGRID; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
2002). The FERC Form 1, the Annual Report for
Major Electric Utilities, is filed by major elec-
tric utilities.3 The report for each utility, aver-
aging a hefty 140 pages, contains general cor-
porate information, financial statements and sup-
porting schedules, and a wealth of engineering
statistics. EGRID contains emissions and resource
mix data for essentially all U.S. electricity generat-
ing plants. EGRID contains information from three
federal agencies: the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA), and the Federal Energy Reg-
ulatory Commission (FERC). EGRID aggregates
the data from the plant level to the utility com-
pany level, providing a detailed emissions profile,
as well as the generation resource mix and capac-
ity, ownership, corporate affiliation and location
information, and other pertinent variables.
To test our hypotheses, we estimated changes
in the generation mix that reflect strategic choices
made by utilities.
Dependent variable
Change in percentage of generation from
renewables
This variable represents the yearly changes in per-
centages of renewable generation as a percentage
of the electricity generated by a utility. Using
information from the EGRID database, we cal-
culated the difference between the percentages of
renewable generation in two consecutive years:
Dependent
variable
=


Generation from
renewablest
Total
generationt
∗ 100


−


Generation from
renewablest−1
Total
generationt−1
∗ 100


3 Major electric utilities are classified as those with annual
sales or transmission service that exceeds one of the following:
(1) 1,000,000 megawatt hours of total annual sales; (2) 100
megawatt hours of annual sales for resale; (3) 500 megawatt
hours of gross interchange out; or (4) 500 megawatt hours of
wheeling for others (deliveries plus losses).
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Independent variables
Deregulation
To pick up the effect of deregulation, we created a
time-changing variable that represents whether or
not retail deregulation policy had been enacted in
a given state. To do so, we used information from
the U.S. Department of Energy (2000). Although
the particulars of the policies varied across juris-
dictions, the formal adoption of retail deregulation
is an important threshold that is tractable and con-
sistent across states.4 The creation of this variable
for a given utility is complicated, however, because
17 percent of our utilities operate in both regu-
lated and deregulated states. To address this issue,
we followed Delmas and Tokat (2005) and created
a time-changing variable that takes the value of
1 starting in the year in which retail deregulation
was enacted or a regulatory order was issued, and 0
otherwise. This variable was then weighted based
on the percentage of electricity sold by the util-
ity in each state to create the variable deregulation
used in the regression.
There are other types of deregulation that states
adopted, sometimes in concert with retail deregula-
tion. Two such policies were (a) to require utilities
to divest their generating assets and (b) to allow
the recovery of stranded costs (costs associated
with plants approved and built in the monopoly
era that were too expensive to be viable in a com-
petitive context). To explore the sensitivity of our
results to other types of deregulation, we created
two additional variables that represent whether
(a) there was retail deregulation and the recovery
of stranded costs was allowed, and (b) there was
retail deregulation but recovery of stranded costs
was disallowed (see Delmas and Tokat, 2005).5
The results of the regressions with these variables
are not significantly different from the ones that
are presented in this paper and are available upon
request from the authors.
4 Recall that retail deregulation did not confer complete freedom
on competitors, as in every case the state placed a cap on prices
when it adopted retail deregulation.
5 Only one utility in our sample belongs to a state that required
firms to divest their assets, so we could not use ‘deregulation
with divesture’ as a separate category. The observations of this
utility were classified in the deregulation ‘only’ group. The
results are the same without this utility.
Environmental sensitivity
The environmental sensitivity of the citizens of the
state in which the firm operates plays a pivotal role
in our story. Several prior researchers have used
the scores of the League of Conservation Voters
(LCV) as a measure of the environmental senti-
ment of the people of a state (Gray, 1997; Terry
and Yandle, 1997).6 Each year, the LCV selects
environmental issues that constitute the environ-
mental agenda with a panel comprising the main
U.S. environmental groups. The organization then
creates an index by counting the number of times
that each representative or senator in Congress
votes in favor of the ‘environmental agenda’ (e.g.,
against logging in national forests or for proper
mining waste disposal). The index ranges from 0
to 100, with 100 representing a record of voting
with the environmental agenda in all cases. Fol-
lowing Kahn (2002) and Levinson (1999), the raw
variable is calculated as the average of the envi-
ronmental scores of members of the U.S. House of
Representatives and Senate. We then weighted this
average by the total number of Congressional rep-
resentatives in each state and by the percentage of
generation of each firm in each state. Our source
for voting scores was the League of Conservation
Voters (1998, 1999).
Percentage of generation from coal
To create this variable, we used EGRID to cal-
culate the percentage of electricity generated by
coal.
6 To verify that LCV ratings do reflect the environmental senti-
ment of the state’s population generally, we attempted to validate
them by comparing them to percentage of the state’s residents
that are members of the Sierra Club. We had membership data
only for 2004, so it could not be used in the analysis. But the
correlation between the 2004 LCV average rating for a state
and the percentage of its residents that were Sierra Club mem-
bers in 2004 was 0.45. This suggests that the LCV ratings are a
reasonable measure of the strength of state-wide environmental
sensitivity. In theory, it could be the case that the character
of a state’s politics, picked up by the Environmental Sensi-
tivity variable, might also suggest pro-deregulation sentiment.
This endogeneity problem, however, is not shown in an analy-
sis of the determinants of deregulation by the states. Ando and
Palmer (1998) explored early moves toward deregulation by state
commissions and legislatures, and found that in six regression
equations the LCV rating only predicted state action in one, with
a negative effect. This indicates that endogeneity is not an issue
in our model.
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Efficiency
We estimated productive efficiency using Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) (Charnes, Cooper,
and Rhodes, 1978; Banker, Charnes, and Cooper,
1984). The DEA technique uses linear program-
ming to convert multiple input and output mea-
sures into a single measure of relative efficiency
for each observation. Further details on DEA and
how we used it appear in the Appendix.
Control variables
Renewables
We needed to control for the presence of the firm’s
previous investments in renewables and to avoid
multicollinearity problems with the coal gener-
ation variable. In doing so, we also needed to
avoid overdetermination with the dependent vari-
able. So we included a dummy variable to repre-
sent whether a utility has made some investment in
renewables at t − 1. The variable takes the value
of 1 when a utility is generating electricity from
renewables at t − 1, and 0 when the utility is not
generating electricity from renewables at t − 1.7
New entrants
The number of new entrants in the competitive
environment where the utility operates may impact
the incumbent firms’ strategies. We created a vari-
able that represents the number of new firms
entering the state’s market divided by the total
number of firms per state and year. This mea-
sure was then weighted based on the percentage
of electricity sold in each state for multi-states
utilities. We constructed this variable using the
entire U.S. electric utility population (i.e., investor-
owned, public-owned, cooperative and federal util-
ities). The information came from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration, Form EIA-861 (1998,
1999).
7 To further consider the possibility that utilities may have ‘pre-
positioned’ themselves for coming deregulation, we collected
data on two types of renewables (hydroelectric facilities and
non-hydroelectric facilities) for utilities in each of the years
1997–2000. We found no significant differences for either cate-
gory in 1997. From 1998 through 2000, states that implemented
deregulation did not see a significant difference for hydroelec-
tric facilities. However, for those same three years, states that
deregulated witnessed a significant increase in renewables when
compared to non-deregulating states.
Renewables portfolio standard in place
This variable captures the effect of operating in a
state with an established renewable portfolio stan-
dard (RPS). An RPS mandates that utilities gen-
erate a specified proportion of their energy from
renewable sources. We first created a variable that
takes the value 1 in the year a state has enacted
RPS and the following years, and 0 otherwise.
The data for this variable were derived from the
National Database of State Incentives for Renew-
able Energy (Interstate Renewable Energy Council,
2004). For multi-state utilities, this variable was
weighted based on the percentage of electricity
sold within each state by the utility.
TRI/area
To pick up the influence of environmental condi-
tions in the state, we included a variable to proxy
the level of emissions in the states where the utility
operates in analyses. Following King and Lenox
(2000) and Kassinis and Vafeas (2002), we used
the state’s toxic emissions (the total amount of
on-site and off-site toxic release) from the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Toxics
Release Inventory (TRI) database (U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 1998–1999), and then
divided this number by the state’s land area (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2000). For firms that operate in
several states, we weighted this measure by the
percent of electricity generated in each state. If
more polluted states gain more from clean produc-
tion, this variable will pick up the effect.
Residential proportion of customers
This variable was included to pick up the effect of
differences in the types of customers served by the
utility. If residential customers are more receptive
to renewable generation, then the coefficient on
this variable should be positive. The variable is the
ratio of residential sales divided by the total sales
to ultimate consumers in megawatt hours. The data
came from FERC Form 1 reports.
Annual net generation
To proxy the size of the firm we used the annual net
generation of the firm in megawatt hours given in
the EGRID database. A logarithmic transformation
was used to reduce skewness.
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Average plant age
The age of the generators could influence the abil-
ity of a utility to create change. The older the
average plant age, the easier it might be to justify
investments in new technologies like renewables.
Alternatively, old plants could reflect an organi-
zational inertia that might inhibit investments in
new technologies. Using EGRID, we computed the
average number of years since the installation of
each generating unit. The aggregation at the utility
level was based on the percentage of ownership of
each generating unit.
Research and development
This variable represents the research and devel-
opment expenses divided by the total operational
expenses that the utility reports to FERC. Firms
with greater investments in R&D may have a
higher probability of investing in renewables than
those that invest less in R&D. A logarithmic trans-
formation of this variable was used to reduce skew-
ness.
Merger process with gas or electricity utilities
We also controlled for the effects of merger activ-
ity. From 1995 to 2000, 36 mergers or acqui-
sitions were completed between investor-owned
electric utilities or between investor-owned elec-
tric utilities and independent power producers
(U.S. Department of Energy, 2000).8 We measured
whether an electric utility went through a merger
with other electric utilities or non-utility power
producers, or with gas producers. A merger with
an electricity company was considered as a related
merger, and a merger with a gas company cor-
responded to a diversification strategy. When a
firm goes through a merger, there is uncertainty
about whether the merger will be accepted and
how to merge the assets of the different compa-
nies. In addition, during the merger process, there
can be changes in the structure of the firm. For
example, firms may decide to downsize their labor
force or adopt similar technologies in the merged
facilities or retire some of their facilities. During
this adjustment period, it is possible that a firm
will slow down other strategic moves such as the
8 We obtained additional information on the mergers from
the FERC website: http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-
info/mergers/merger-apps.asp.
adoption of an environmental differentiation strat-
egy. If the utility itself or its holding company goes
through a merger process, then the indicator was
1 the year before until the year after the merger
is completed (i.e., if the merger took place in year
1999, the indicator would be 1 for the years 1998
and 1999).
Interconnected network membership
We controlled for location in a specific inter-
connected network to which the electric utility
belongs. An interconnected network (or power
grid) consists of extra-high-voltage connections
between utilities designed to distribute the electri-
cal energy from one part of the network to another.
Transfers between networks are nearly impossible
because there are few lines that connect them. Fol-
lowing the U.S. Energy Information Administra-
tion, we used the following three major networks:
(1) the Eastern Interconnected System, consisting
of the eastern two-thirds of the United States;
(2) the Western Interconnected System, consist-
ing primarily of the Southwest and areas west of
the Rocky Mountains; and (3) the Texas Intercon-
nected System, consisting mainly of Texas. Each
firm in our sample belongs to one of three of these
networks, so we omitted the Eastern network to
avoid overdetermination.
Year effects
We included a dummy variable for the year 1999
to pick up any effects specific to the years in the
analysis.
Estimation method
We performed a pooled OLS estimation regression.
We used the Cook–Weisberg and the White test
statistics to check the homoscedasticity assumption
and found the presence of heteroscedasticity (Cook
and Weisberg, 1983; White 1980). In order to cor-
rect for heteroscedasticity, we used a robust-cluster
estimator of the standard errors in our regressions.
The robust-cluster variance estimator is a variant
of the Huber–White robust estimator, which pro-
vides correct standard errors in the presence of
any pattern of heteroscedasticity. It also remains
valid and provides correct coverage in the pres-
ence of any pattern of correlation among errors
within units. This estimator allowed us to relax
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the assumption of independence of errors in the
regressions. Since we used a pooled time-series
approach, repeated observations may create cor-
related error terms and inflate t-statistics without
using this correction.9 The robust-cluster estima-
tor produces correct standard errors even when the
observations are correlated within clusters (Stata-
Corp, 1999).
Another alternative approach is to use a panel
data regression with firm random effects, where
the error term contains a unit specific component
as randomly distributed across cross-section units.
This method takes into account the individual-
level differences between utilities over time, cap-
turing this heterogeneity in the error term. We esti-
mated the model using the option of Huber–White
estimator of standard errors to correct for het-
eroscedasticity. The results using this specification
match the results using pooled OLS with robust-
cluster estimator of the standard errors.10 However,
the Lagrange multiplier test (Breusch and Pagan,
9 The robust-cluster standard errors are unaffected by the pres-
ence of unmeasured firm-specific factors causing correlation
among errors of observations for the same firm, or for that matter
any other form of within-unit error correlation.
10 Random effects estimates (available from the authors) show
very similar effect sizes and an identical pattern of significance
for controls and independent variables.
1980) for the random-effects model suggests that
the pooled regression model is the most suitable.
To test our hypotheses, we needed to interact
the variables measuring deregulation and environ-
mental sensitivity in a state (Hypothesis 1), dereg-
ulation and percentage of generation from coal
(Hypothesis 2), and deregulation and efficiency
(Hypothesis 3). To avoid multicollinearity, we first
de-meaned these variables, and then computed the
interaction terms as the product of each pair of
de-meaned variables. All right-hand-side variables
were lagged 1 year.
RESULTS
Tables 2 and 3 display descriptive statistics and
correlations for the variables used in the analysis.
The collinearity diagnostics, including variance
inflation factors, indicate that multicollinearity was
not a problem in the statistical analysis. The pooled
OLS regression results with robust-cluster robust
estimator are presented in Table 4.
In Table 4, Model A presents the results of the
regression with the control variables, and serves as
a baseline model. In Model B, we include the vari-
ables that represent whether or not deregulation has
been enacted and the environmental sensitivity of
the population. In Model C, we test Hypothesis 1
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max
Change in percentage of generation by renewables 228 1.39 10.72 −16.45 64.40
Deregulation 228 0.42 0.48 0.00 1.00
League of Conservation Voters (LCV) rating 228 43.55 22.30 2.00 96.67
Percentage of generation from coal 228 53.51 39.46 0.00 99.97
Efficiency 228 92.59 9.45 52.90 100.00
Deregulation × LCV rating 228 4.33 10.13 −22.37 27.66
Deregulation × Coal 228 4.11 18.49 −27.20 27.06
Deregulation × Efficiency 228 0.50 4.40 −10.97 18.11
Renewables (dummy) 228 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
New entrants 228 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.37
Renewables portfolio standard 228 0.12 0.31 0.00 1.00
TRI/Area 228 1.32 1.12 0.01 4.02
Residential proportion of customers 228 0.29 0.13 0.00 0.53
Annual net generation (log scale) 228 15.31 2.38 6.56 18.23
Average plant age 228 29.63 10.65 3.49 78.00
Research and development (log scale) 228 0.81 0.78 0.00 3.61
Merger process with gas utility 228 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Merger process with electric utility 228 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
Eastern interconnected system 228 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00
Western interconnected system 228 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00
Texas interconnected system 228 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
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Table 4. Pooled regression results
Dependent variable: change in percentage of generation by renewablesa
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Deregulation 4.951 5.277 5.253 5.433 6.184
(1.614)∗∗ (1.592)∗∗ (1.605)∗∗ (1.597)∗∗ (1.559)∗∗
League of Conservation Voters (LCV) rating 0.092 0.088 0.076 0.085 0.064
(0.040)∗ (0.039)∗ (0.040)+ (0.039)∗ (0.038)+
Percentage of generation from coal −0.085 −0.075 −0.068 −0.081 −0.068 −0.063
(0.023)∗∗ (0.022)∗∗ (0.022)∗∗ (0.022)∗∗ (0.022)∗∗ (0.022)∗∗
Efficiency −0.198 −0.261 −0.264 −0.245 −0.299 −0.297
(0.079)∗ (0.077)∗∗ (0.076)∗∗ (0.077)∗∗ (0.077)∗∗ (0.075)∗∗
Efficiency × LCV rating 0.190 0.192
(0.068)∗∗ (0.069)∗∗
Deregulation × Coal −0.085 −0.078
(0.039)∗ (0.039)∗
Deregulation × Efficiency −0.432 −0.560
(0.154)∗∗ (0.152)∗∗
Renewables (dummy) 2.718 3.036 2.961 2.620 2.981 2.506
(1.449)+ (1.399)∗ (1.377)∗ (1.400)+ (1.377)∗ (1.347)+
New entrants 0.341 −1.007 −1.073 −1.286 −0.727 −0.965
(1.130) (1.118) (1.100) (1.115) (1.104) (1.075)
Renewables portfolio standard 0.667 −0.584 0.262 −0.477 0.792 2.153
(2.436) (2.485) (2.463) (2.463) (2.494) (2.444)
TRI emissions/Area −0.241 −0.131 −0.029 −0.117 −0.203 −0.109
(0.794) (0.758) (0.746) (0.751) (0.746) (0.723)
Residential proportion of customers −2.811 −2.570 −2.184 −3.380 −2.998 −3.483
(5.757) (5.492) (5.405) (5.456) (5.406) (5.256)
Annual net generation (log scale) 0.749 1.117 1.297 1.168 1.046 1.253
(0.378)∗ (0.377)∗∗ (0.377)∗∗ (0.375)∗∗ (0.372)∗∗ (0.365)∗∗
Average plant age −0.198 −0.178 −0.157 −0.139 −0.185 −0.128
(0.069)∗∗ (0.066)∗∗ (0.065)∗ (0.068)∗ (0.065)∗∗ (0.065)+
Research and development (log scale) 0.216 −0.198 0.091 −0.479 −0.306 −0.304
(0.953) (0.922) (0.913) (0.923) (0.909) (0.900)
Merger process with gas −1.771 −2.103 −2.477 −2.796 −1.646 −2.524
(3.101) (2.969) (2.924) (2.960) (2.926) (2.848)
Merger process with electric utility −2.613 −4.396 −4.956 −4.410 −4.874 −5.594
(1.702) (1.665)∗∗ (1.650)∗∗ (1.650)∗∗ (1.647)∗∗ (1.611)∗∗
Western interconnected system −5.185 −4.810 −3.911 −4.307 −5.176 −3.915
(2.548)∗ (2.463)+ (2.445) (2.452)+ (2.427)∗ (2.373)
Texas interconnected system −4.262 −1.972 −1.434 −1.869 −2.797 −2.407
(4.213) (4.084) (4.022) (4.048) (4.029) (3.905)
Year 1999 2.393 2.004 1.814 1.816 1.920 1.529
(1.450) (1.414) (1.393) (1.404) (1.392) (1.352)
Constant 18.361 19.019 14.199 16.286 17.900 17.985
(9.118)∗ (8.699)∗ (8.728) (8.712)+ (8.735)∗ (8.593)∗
Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228
Adj. R2 0.12 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.27
Incremental F -test (Reference Model: A) 11.51∗∗ 10.58∗∗ 9.47∗∗ 10.56∗∗ 9.91∗∗
a Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+ Significant at 10%; ∗ significant at 5%; ∗∗ significant at 1%
by incorporating the interaction effect between
deregulation and the environmental sensitivity of
the population in the state. In Model D, we test
Hypothesis 2 by adding the interaction effect
between deregulation and the percentage of gen-
eration from coal. In Model E, we test Hypothesis
3 by adding the interaction effect between dereg-
ulation and efficiency. Model F is the full model.
As the adjusted R2 statistics and incremental F -
tests show, compared to Model A each addition
of new variable(s) significantly improves the fit of
the model.
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We find that the coefficient of the variable repre-
senting the percentage of coal used in the produc-
tion mix is negative and significant at the 1 percent
level in all models. In our sample, the higher
the percentage of coal generation, the lower the
increase in the generation from renewables the
following year. The coefficient of the variable rep-
resenting firm’s efficiency is negative and signifi-
cant at the 5 percent level in Model A, and at the
1 percent level in Models B to F. This indicates
that firms enjoying higher levels of efficiency are
less likely to increase their generation from renew-
ables. The coefficients for the variable capturing
whether the firm had already made some invest-
ments in renewables are positive and significant,
showing that these firms are more likely to increase
their generation from renewables in the next year.
Several other variables are significant. The vari-
able representing the size of utilities is positively
and significantly associated with the dependent
variable throughout the models. The variable rep-
resenting the average plant age is negative and
significant in all the models. Thus, expansion of
renewable generation is more rapid for larger and
younger companies. Finally, the coefficients of the
variable representing merger activities with elec-
tric utility companies is negative and significant
in Models B–F, showing that companies that are
engaged in merger processes invest less in renew-
ables. This may have to do with the difficulty of
taking a new strategic path while integrating two
companies. The effect of being inter-tied to the
Western power grid is weakly significant in several
equations as well.
The coefficients on variables representing dereg-
ulation and the environmental sensitivity of the
population in the state are positive and significant
at 1–10 percent level respectively in Models B
through F. The finding of a positive direct effect for
deregulation on investments in renewables is itself
a noteworthy result. This may indicate that since
all states presumably have some green consumers,
a basic level of activity appeared throughout the
country following deregulation.
In Model C, the interaction term between dereg-
ulation and the environmental sensitivity of the
population in the state is positive and significant
at the 1 percent level. In deregulated states, firms
located where citizens display greater environmen-
tal sensitivity increase the share of renewables in
their production mix more than firms that operate
only in deregulated states or only in states with
a high environmental sensitivity. Thus, Hypoth-
esis 1 is supported. In Model D, the interaction
term between deregulation and the percentage of
generation from coal is negative and significant
at the 5 percent level. In deregulated states, the
more firms rely on coal, the less they will increase
their generation from renewables in the follow-
ing year. This finding is consistent with Hypoth-
esis 2. The interaction term between deregulation
and firms’ efficiency is negative and significant at
the 1 percent level in Model E. So in deregulated
states, increases in efficiency dampen the positive
effect of deregulation on increased generation from
renewables. This result supports Hypothesis 3. In
Model F, all interaction terms retain their signs and
level of significance, confirming all of the hypothe-
ses.
Limitations
We must note some limitations to our analysis.
Confidence in our results would be enhanced if we
had more years of data in our analysis. Also, we
did not control for firm-specific unobserved het-
erogeneity. For this reason, if there are omitted
variables that systematically covary with indepen-
dent variables, it is possible that our analysis is
picking up their effects rather than the variables
that we used. Finally, we did not have infor-
mation on the exact nature of price premiums
being charged for green power. This information
could have been used to more clearly specify the
cause–effect chain.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Institutional change and strategic choice
We find that utilities were more likely to take
strategic actions to support an environmental dif-
ferentiation strategy following deregulation in
states where citizens display higher degrees of
environmental sensitivity. Under deregulation,
however, incumbent firms that relied heavily on
coal-fired generation or enjoyed strong produc-
tive efficiencies were less likely to adopt such
strategies. These results allow us to conclude that
deregulation has led to a series of strategic choices
by which utilities connected their power offerings
both to the context in which they operated and
to their particular endowment of organizational
resources.
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Taken alone, this outcome resembles a competi-
tive context. But institutional change like dereg-
ulation influences strategic choices in a unique
way. Seen in retrospect, regulation acted as a
shaper and delimiter of resource development and
the set of opportunities open to a firm, and in
essence mandated path dependencies. This typi-
cally is manifested in statutory limits on domains
of activity, such as when savings and loans could
not develop competencies outside of residential
lending or when AT&T was barred from develop-
ing resources to serve telecommunications markets
overseas from 1934 until 1984. What we discov-
ered in our analysis was that the external envi-
ronment faced by utilities also is strongly shaped
by regulation in ways that push them on partic-
ular strategic paths. It was not that utilities were
prevented from developing green power resources
(and of course, several of them did so). Rather, it
was their monopoly status and the nature of util-
ity regulation that blocked incentives for offering
green power as a new retail product, in turn bias-
ing downward opportunities for utilities to promote
renewable generation.
Our study thus suggests two points to consider
about the post-deregulation marketplace. The first
is that the marketplace under regulation was not
allowed to develop and mature in ways that would
have demonstrated the viability of new customer
classes. Latent demand for differentiated services
was suppressed. In short, the richness of prod-
uct offerings that characterizes so many markets
for consumer goods was absent under regula-
tion. While many observers, especially economists,
have applauded how deregulation has boosted con-
sumer welfare via lower prices, few have high-
lighted the many product innovations that deregu-
lation also elicited once firms were able to energize
latent markets (e.g., Winston, 1998).
The second and related point is that shifts
in the institutional environment often generate
significant marketplace discontinuities (Haveman
et al., 2001). As just noted, one of the reasons that
such discontinuities are so striking is simply that
customer segments were suppressed under regula-
tion. It is easy to see how deregulation can create
unpredictable change, a competitive landscape of
heterogeneous strategies, and winners and losers
when a new freedom to take strategic action coin-
cides with the sudden unleashing of marketplace
demands. In our case, environmental differentia-
tion ensued.
Environmental differentiation in action
Our results indicate that the environmental sen-
sitivity of the populace served by a utility was
reflected in its managerial actions. In other indus-
tries, the idea that companies would act in accor-
dance with the preferences of their customers
is hardly a subject for lively debate. But it is
news in this industry, as market-like behavior sup-
planted the more paternalistic approach under reg-
ulation. Historically, regulatory commissions were
expected to articulate the desires and protect the
interests of the populace, in theory creating effi-
cient and socially optimum outcomes. However,
even when commissions acted in the public interest
(as opposed to being dominated by the compa-
nies they regulated), their mission was conceived
narrowly. Although occasionally playing different
roles in promoting alternative technologies (Russo,
2001), mandating a particular structure for pric-
ing (Shepherd, 1985) and so on, most commis-
sions focused their energy on scrutinizing the cost
structure of utilities. Their collective attention was
directed to review of rates charged to customers
and two associated areas: fuel and construction
costs.
Slowly, deregulation is metamorphosing this
industry. In the world of utilities, as deregula-
tion unfolds, the power to influence their activities
and policies is migrating from regulatory commis-
sions expected to represent customers to the cus-
tomers themselves. And that change has potentially
profound ramifications. Under traditional utility
regulation, a clearly defined institutional appara-
tus developed to bond utilities and commissions.
Across nearly a century of use, this apparatus
became standardized and the regulatory agenda
became defined and constrained (Gormley, 1983).
As with the prototypical institutional process, the
idea of vertically integrated monopoly achieved
taken-for-granted status. This was only challenged
with the passage of PURPA, which unexpectedly
created the conditions for competition in this world
(Joskow, 1997).
For the foreseeable future, the electric genera-
tion industry will retain a strong institutional char-
acter. However, our results indicate the beginnings
of behavior consistent with more market-like ten-
dencies. Environmental differentiation by firms,
especially when the populace they serve is most
likely to value that differentiation, was very much
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in evidence in our sample. Essentially, this differ-
entiation acts in ways that Porter (1985) and others
would expect: it creates value by identifying an
underserved constituency and developing products
that will interest it. The success of green power
depends on taking a quintessential commodity, a
kilowatt-hour, and differentiating it by how it is
created.
Differentiation, private benefits, and the
common good
By leveraging the literature on environmental dif-
ferentiation in consumer markets, we can trace out
the link between deregulation and the provision of
public goods. Compared to conventional products,
environmental differentiation consists of offering
products that provide greater environmental ben-
efits, or that impose smaller environmental costs.
These products may be costlier than those tradi-
tional products, but they allow the firm to com-
mand a price premium in the marketplace or to
capture additional market share. The environmen-
tal differentiation literature argues that one way of
creating willingness to pay for public goods is to
bundle them with private goods (Reinhardt, 1998).
For example, many consumers are willing to pay
a premium for organic food products that benefit
directly their health and may taste better than non-
organic products. Speaking of Toyota’s entry in
the hybrid automobile market, an industry observer
opined that ‘if you want to wear your green cre-
dentials on your sleeve, the Prius is the way to go’
(Ulrich, 2004). Thus, the Prius produces a private
benefit to the wearer as others see his or her pro-
environmental behavior. Green electricity does not
offer private benefits—other than the warm glow
of altruism—because green and brown electricity
are identical once they reach the consumer, and
because the product’s use is within the household
of the consumer.
How can such a lack of private benefits be over-
come? One way is to use the public policy process
to create the benefit. Consider first how this is play-
ing out in the case of sustainably harvested lumber.
Like electricity, lumber represents a case where
it is difficult to bundle private and public goods:
green lumber does not have physical characteris-
tics that differ from brown lumber. It is therefore
hard to imagine that mainstream customers will be
willing to buy green lumber certified by the For-
est Stewardship Council (FSC) at a 10–20 percent
premium. At this point, policy-driven government
purchases of green building materials still consti-
tute most of the demand for FSC certified lumber.
But as sales volumes rise the supply chain for
FSC lumber will mature. Provided that additional
sellers of FSC certified lumber are drawn to the
marketplace, the price of FSC lumber will become
competitive with non-FSC lumber, delivering pri-
vate benefits.
A similar mechanism could occur in the elec-
tricity market. Green consumers still represent the
minority of consumers, and change may come
from recent public policies calling for require-
ments of minimums of green energy consumption
by state-owned facilities. In the short term the
effect of such mandates may be to increase the
cost of green power via growth in demand. But if
over the longer term these purchases can bring the
costs of green power to competitive levels, broad-
ened demand will energize scale economies and
learning curve effects for manufacturers. In this
way, demand for green power will expand and pri-
vate benefits will appear. But this process is quite
circuitous, compared to the more straightforward
provision of private benefits seen in organic pro-
duce and other consumer product markets, where
the private benefit is obvious and relatively imme-
diate.
We have extended knowledge in the area of
environmental differentiation with our analysis.
Environmental differentiation plays out in ways
that blend together traditional differentiation strate-
gies with an element of conscious contribution
to the common good that is not generally seen
in the more familiar product differentiation that
consumers face. It should be borne in mind that
the study of this phenomenon is broader than
the environmental context. For example, many
social issues create platforms for differentiation
in analogous ways, as when consumers take
into account labor practices of companies when
making purchasing decisions. Our knowledge of
these points of ‘social differentiation’—strategies
used to create and exploit them, and the relative
longevity of advantages they may create—is min-
imal. With information about the companies that
make their products increasingly available and rel-
evant to consumers, social differentiation also may
become an important marketplace trend. Though
researchers face a gap in the literature on this topic,
that gap translates into a sizeable opportunity to
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study a phenomenon fueled by a growing momen-
tum.
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APPENDIX: THE DATA ENVELOPMENT
ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE
The DEA technique uses linear programming to
convert multiple input and output measures into
a single measure of relative efficiency for each
observation. A piecewise linear industry best prac-
tice frontier is constructed using the observations
in the sample. If a firm is on this frontier, it is
considered efficient. If it is not on the frontier,
its radial distance from the best practice frontier
is a measure of the firm’s inefficiency. Majumdar
(1998) presents a good overview of the DEA tech-
nique, while Coelli, Rao, and Battese (1998) pro-
vide a more detailed description. DEA is emerging
as a powerful tool of data analysis for the elec-
tric utility sector as corroborated by the study of
Majumdar and Marcus (2001), who used DEA in
their paper on the impact of flexible environmen-
tal regulations on productivity in the electric utility
sector.
Our construction of the measure of efficiency
is derived from the work of Delmas and
Tokat (2005), who analyzed the productivity
consequences of deregulation regulations in the
electric utility sector. Data came from FERC Form
1 reports. The efficiency of a firm in a specific year
is computed by comparing it to all other firms in
the same year, using a program written by Coelli
(1996).
We use an input-oriented efficiency measure,
which seeks to reduce the input without changing
the output. Our DEA calculations also recognize
that not all firms are operating at optimal scale.
Therefore, we allow different firms to have dif-
ferent returns to scale and the efficiency measure
is devoid of the scale effects (Coelli, 1996). The
inputs and outputs of the variable that represents
efficiency are described below.
Inputs
We use the following items as inputs: labor cost,
plant value, production expenses, transmission
expenses, distribution expenses, sales, administra-
tive and general expenses, and electricity pur-
chased from other sources in dollars. Our choice
of inputs is consistent with the literature. Roberts
(1986) suggests using electricity purchased from
others, capital used in transmission and distribu-
tion in addition to generation inputs. Similarly,
Majumdar and Marcus (2001) include produc-
tion expenses, transmission expenses, distribution
expenses, administrative and general expenses,
number of employees as inputs to electric utilities,
and electricity purchased from other sources.
Outputs
We consider the following outputs: low-voltage
sales (residential and commercial), high-voltage
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sales (industrial), and sales for resale to other utili-
ties. A firm’s cost of supplying power to final con-
sumers is affected by the type of customer it serves
(Roberts, 1986; Thompson, 1997). High voltage
sales incur less transmission costs than low voltage
sales due to reduced operating and maintenance
costs. Furthermore, wholesale sales are less costly
than both low and high voltage sales, since they
typically occur on less costly off-peak hours and
entail larger quantities per transaction (Berry and
Mixon, 1999). We consider these three types of
outputs separately because of their differing costs.
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